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CLASS ACTIONS: HOW EASY ARE THEY TO
BRING, AND WHY?
I. INTRODUCTION
"There is power in unity and there is power in numbers."' Class
actions, through the power of unity, are no exception to that motto. 2 Class
actions provide a means for claims to be litigated that would otherwise be
barred from litigation.3 Between 2013 and 2014, there was an "explosion"
of class action litigation regarding workplace issues. 4 Class actions have the
potential to be financially crippling to employers.5 But what about when
each individual bringing the class action has a different motive?6 Class
actions can only be brought when there is a common question of fact and a
common award of damages to the entire class; this note will address the
issues involved with bringing class actions.7
An inherent problem regarding class actions has been litigating
through Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 23(a)(2), (b)(1),
(b)(2), and (b)(3) regarding class actions.8 In 2011, the United States
1 See

Keep

on

Moving,

NPR

(Jan.

21,

2002),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryId- 1136695.
2 See infra note 3 and accompanying text (noting class actions are collaboration of many
claims).
3 See Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to ClassActionProcedurein the UnitedStates,
DUKE 1, 1 (2000), https://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf (noting that
initiating class action suit is only practicable if benefits outweigh costs of litigation). Often the
damages to each individual are miniscule, but in the aggregate, they amount to a large social
injustice. Id.
4 See Letter from J. Stephen Poor, Finn Managing Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, to clients (Jan.
2015),
(on
file
with
Seyfarth
Shaw),
available
at
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/files/2015/01IWCAR-Intro2.pdf (noting employment class
actions often have adverse market consequences for employers).
5 See id (explaining financial implication of class actions). The monetary value of the top ten
private settlements for the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act ("ERISA") class actions of

2014 was $1.31 billion. SEYFARTH
LITIGATION REPORT 40 (2015).

SHAW

LLP, 1 1 TH ANNUAL

WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION

See generallyFED. R. CIV. P. 23 (addressing issue of commonality).
See generally id. (noting necessary requirements for class to be certifiable).
8 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 336-67 (2011) (holding class
non-certifiable because plaintiffs did not have enough in common in their claims); Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1434-35 (2013) (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (holding class
non-certifiable because class did not meet predominance requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3)).
6
7
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Supreme Court decided that a class is only certifiable under Rule 23(a)(2)
when the court finds commonality, not only in the question at hand, but also
in the answer to the question. 9 The Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. further
laid a foundation for Rule 23 (b)(2), holding that when individual class
members are seeking individual relief, the class is precluded from class
certification.'"
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. also determined when a class is
certifiable pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which occurs when class issues
predominate over individual issues." However, in a case involving an
antitrust class action, Comcast Corp., the court also analyzed Rule 23 (b)(3),
holding individual questions cannot predominate over class questions;
12
otherwise the class is precluded from class certification.
Courts continue to struggle with class certification when undergoing
the "rigorous analysis" required for class certification under Rule 23.13 A
more recent case, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,4 seeks to apply the test
evolved from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp., in 2016.15 Tyson
Foods,Inc. permitted class certification through the statistical mechanism of
averaging the class members' damages, in order to meet the Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirement of predominance. 6 If the class meets the requirements of Rule
23(b)(2), then it will be certifiable because no individual member's issue
would predominate over the class issue.7
This note will aim to prove that, with the recent decision in Tyson
Foods, Inc., classes will be allowed to receive certification using statistical
averages, specifically the average amount of overtime. 8 The court's further
liberalization and accessibility to class actions for consumers and employees
will dramatically increase the number of certifiable class actions, wreaking
9 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (noting dissimilarities in class have potential
impact on generation of common questions).
10 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 4 (stating classes must adequately protect everyone's
interests).
11 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (stating same injury will not necessarily create
class action, but must depend on common contention).
12 See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (requiring class action claims to predominate over
individual claims). One class member's action may not predominate over other class members,
and a class action must be the "superior" way to adjudicate the issue. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
13 See Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 564 U.S. at 350-51 (holding classes must undergo "rigorous

analysis" before being certified as class).
14 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15 See id. at 1045 (majority opinion) (describing class certification); see also Alexander, supra
note 3, at 4-5 (laying out requirements to be certified as a class).
16 See Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (holding expert's average time employees spent
donning protective gear satisfies Rule 23(b) predominance of commonality).
17 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352 (noting overlapping commonalities).
18 See infra Part IV, Section D (discussing the liberalization of class actions).
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havoc on employers and businesses. 9 Though class action procedures may
vary from state to state, this note analyzes Tyson Foods, Inc. with the federal
application of Rule 23 regarding class actions. z
In order to establish a foundation for the further progression of class
certification, this note begins with a discussion of the history of class actions
in Part II, which elaborates on the general concept of class actions, their
earliest forms, and how the first class actions in the United States
developed. 21 This section leads into the facts behind Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and
how they have come to significance in the recent Tyson Foods,Inc. decision,
and will come to significance in future litigation. 2 Part II Section A further
discusses the development and application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and its
evolution, including: primitive class action law suits, Equity Rules 38 and
48, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.23 Part II
Section C will then review the modem use and definition of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23 and all of its parts.24 It also will review the modem developments in the
application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and its sub-parts, through the review of
recent case law.25 In Part III Section B, the first case this note reviews, in
light of the modem day application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, is Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. which runs through Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and its subsections, but most
importantly for this note, it gives a definition of when to apply Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3), which has been a significant development for current litigation
involving class actions. 26 The discussion of Wal-Mart Stores Inc. will then
scrutinize how cases subsequent cases to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. have used
the evolved definition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) to allow for class
certification, in III Part C.2 7 Part III, Section D will argue how another recent
decision, Comcast Corp., has further defined and impacted Fed. R. Civ. P.

19 See infra Part IV, Section D.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 4.
21 See injra Part II, Sections A-C (discussing class actions, class actions in their earliest form,
20

and first class actions in United States).
22 See infra Part II, Section A (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and its impact on class actions).
23 See infra Part II, Sections A- C (explaining certification requirements and history of class
action lawsuits).
24 See infra Part III, Section A (discussing mechanics of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and how it certifies
classes).
25 See infra Part III (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 23, class actions, and recent case decisions'
impact).
26 See infra Part III, Section C (discussing how courts have recently been interpreting WalMart Stores, Inc.).
27 See infra Part III, Section C (discussing cases following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 's rules and

reasoning).
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23(b)(3), leading to the further liberalization of class certification. 28
Following Comcast Corp., Section III, Part E will introduce one of the most
recent cases to have received class certification, Tyson Foods,Inc., and will
introduce the idea of statistical methodology in calculating damages so that
class members overcome the predominance requirement, ultimately ignoring
the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) analysis set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and
Comcast Corp.29 The final section, Part IV, will analyze Tyson Foods, Inc.,
in light of the evolving definition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.30
This note argues that the class of Tyson employees suing their
employer should not have been certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 because (a)

not every member of the class was injured and (b) each employee was injured
in a different way and, therefore, (c) individual member's issues predominate
over the class issue in this case.3" Further, creating accessibility to class
certification will overwhelm the courts with class actions, deviating from the
original purpose of class actions.32
II. HISTORY
A. Class Actions
A class action allows a group of people with a common interest to
join together to sue as a group." There are several different categories of

28 See infra Part III, Section D (discussing Corncast Corp.'s impact on applying FED. R. Civ.

P. 23 to future decisions).
29 See infra Part III, Sections C and E (discussing evaluation of differing class members'
relief).
30 See infra Part III, Section E (reviewing currently litigated case involving certification of
class).
31 See infra Part IV, Section D (analyzing decision certifying class of Tyson employees).
32 See infra Part II, Section A (describing mechanics and purpose of class actions).
33 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining class actions level playing field and make it
possible to litigate small claims).
[A] typical Rule 23 class action might begin with an attorney filing a civil complaint in
which a limited number of representativeplaintiffs are individually named. There would
be language in the complaint indicating that the named plaintiffs are seeking to recover
losses or force changes in the defendants' behavior on behalf of both themselves and
"others similarly situated." A motion for class certification would be filed at some point
in the litigation, describing with greater specificity the characteristics of the desired
class, and requesting that a judge review the proposed class definition and the relief
sought and should they meet the various tests of Rule 23, fonnally certify a plaintiff
class. If a class is so certified, one or more of the plaintiffs' attorneys will be named as
class counsel and any subsequent dispositive resolution such as a settlement or a verdict
at trial would apply to the claims of all class members. If a class is not certified, the
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including consumer

rights,

environmental, mass torts, and civil rights.34

securities

and antitrust,

Many of the claims would

never be fiscally productive if it were not for the innovation of class
actions.35 Individuals seeking relief are often harmed in only a small way,
but the aggregation of those harms can lead to large illegal profits for
companies. 3 6 Class actions provide a solution to the problem of large, illegal
profits by pooling small injuries to support the cost(s) of litigation.3 7 Class
actions also empower less economically privileged individuals to pursue
litigation against a company that caused harm to them, and thus have the
opportunity to make them whole once again, without having to front the
expensive cost of litigation.38
However wronged a group of individuals may feel by a company's
actions, a group cannot arbitrarily decide to bring a class action suit; a class
must be formally certified through Fed. R. Civ. P. 23." To bring a class
action, the class must meet the four requirements set out by Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a).4" The four requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. 4' The requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.

matter could continue to be litigated but the outcome would affect only the individually
named plaintiffs.
Nicholas M. Pace, ClassActions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Processand
the
Empirical Literature, RAND
INSTITUTE
FOR
CIVIL
JUSTICE
1,
4,
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA
National Report.pdf
(last visited Jan. 29, 2017). An alternative to class action litigation would be government action,
but government action is not always sufficient or efficient. Id. Often government action would not
provide compensation to those injured by the harm. See generally Alexander, supra note 3, at 2
(noting that government enforcement depends on political priorities).
34 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 2-4 (noting all class actions are subject to FED. R. CIv. P.
23).
31 See id. (concerning assertion of rights only being practicable if benefits outweigh costs of
litigation).
36 See id. at 1 (noting disadvantage of most individuals against corporations). "By 'enabling'
claims, the class action device can provide appropriate incentives for corporations, assuring that
they pay the true costs of their own conduct, rather than passing the costs on to consumers while
retaining the benefits as profit." Id.
37 See id. ("Class actions can also provide a more efficient way to conduct litigation,
eliminating the need to re-litigate the common issues in a large number of individual cases.").
38 See id. (noting aggregate amount of claim makes it possible to pursue litigation).
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (outlining how to certify a class).
40 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 4 (listing requirements that must be met under FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a)).
41 See id. (indicating FED. R. CIV. P. 23 allows for both plaintiff and defendant class actions).
Any member of the class who meets the typicality and adequacy requirements can serve as the
class's representative. Id. at 6. However, the representative does not serve a significant role in the
class action. Id. at 6.
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23(a) must be met before analyzing the class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).42
Upon meeting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)'s requirements, the class must then fit
into a category set forth by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).43 The three categories

concerning Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) are: (1) individualized monetary relief, (2)
injunctive relief, and (3) predominance and proper method of adjudication.44
45
This note is mainly concerned with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) claims.
Rule 23 (b)(3) requires that the class's claim predominate over any
individual claims, and a class action must be the superior method of
adjudication. 46 Most class action claims are brought under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), and those claims mainly arise out of many small claims by
consumers of a mass-produced product.

B. EarliestForms of Class Actions
Class actions were not a utility that was always available to right a
large group of people's misfortunes, but is a device that evolved over a
significant period of time. 48 Modem consumer class actions now prevail in
the twenty-first century, but they are rooted in medieval times. 49 The
primitive form of a class action was known as group litigation.5" The first
42 See id. at 4 (noting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) must be analyzed after FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
examination).
43 See id. at 4-5; see generally FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (providing three categories class must fit
into).
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (delineating types of class actions); Alexander, supra note 3, at 45 (discussing same).
45 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (noting importance of predominance of classes over
individuals).
46 See id. (listing factors to be considered in superior form of adjudication); see also Alexander,
supra note 3, at 4-5 (noting courts often look toward manageability of class to determine if proper
method of adjudication).
47 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Alexander, supra note 3, at 1, 4 (noting 23(b)(3)
requirements and common for mass-produced products to cause same injury to many people). Each
consumer may only have a small claim, but the claims in the aggregate create a significant wrongdoing by the manufacturer of the product. Id.
48 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Pastand Future ofDefendant and Settlement Classes in Collective
Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 687, 690 (1997) (illustrating history of class actions).
49 See Susan T.Spence, Looking Back... In a Collective Way, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(Jul./Aug. 2002), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2002-07-08/spence.html
(explaining
government believed communities should have access to justice). In 1125, a writ of Henry III to
the archbishop of Canterbury stated that "according to our law and custom of the realm ...villages
and communities of villeins... ought to be able to prosecute their please and complaints in our
courts and in those of others through three or four of their number." Yeazell, supra note 48, at 690.
50 See Spence, supra note 49 (discussing first examples of class actions found by Stephen
Yeazell). The earliest known class action lawsuit was Master Martin Rector of Barkway v.
Parishionersof Nuthampstead, circa 1199. Id. "Viewed through a modem lens, Martin v.
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judicially created class action occurred when King Edward I granted the
Channel Islands to Sir Otes for the term of his life.5 ' The civilians of the
island were not fond of this arrangement; "[c]hief among the islanders'
grievances was a confiscatory decree of Sir Otes insisting that all debts and
rents due him or the crown be paid in sound French currency instead of the
debased local coinage of the islands. 52 Discarte's, the plaintiff, duties
involved selling the king's corn, which he sold for local English currency,
but the king insisted on being paid in French currency, which had the effect
of tripling debts.5 3 In turn, Discarte filed a complaint with the local justices
demanding that Otes accept payment in the local English currency.54
Similarly, others occupying the islands wanted to be released from the king's
demands to be paid in French currency.55 Therefore, the justices produced
the idea of a class action to allow the islanders to join forces in defeating the
king's requests. 56
Otes reflects modem class actions because the Channel Islanders
were formed into a group by judicial decree after litigation started, which is

Parishionerslooks like a religious consumer class action about how much of a minister the local
tithes bought, with the parishioners arguing for a full-time, full-service chaplain and the rector
arguing for the cheaper part-time alternative." Id.
51 See Discarte v. Otes, 30 Seld. Society 137 (No. 158, P.C. 1309) (1914) (concerning two
groups that filed separate but similar actions). See Spence, supra note 49 (summarizing events
leading to class action). "The Channel Islands, Normanby heritage, became subject to English rule
at the time of the Norman Conquest. King Edward I of England granted the islands to Sir Otes
Grandison for the term of his life. Otes was not a popular ruler." Id.
52 See Spence, supra note 49.
53 See Spence, supra note 49 (discussing history of class action lawsuits).
51 See id (illustrating background of case).
55 See id. (describing islanders' grievances).
56 See id ("The justices came up with a novel solution: Pass the buck for making the final
decision to the King's Council, but provide that Discarte and'all that are in like case with [Discarte]
are bidden to appear ... before that same Council, either in person or by some one representing
them all, to hear its opinion and to receive such judgment as shall there be delivered.' Thus, the
justices in General Eyre created a class action.") (internal citations omitted). "Marcin suggests that
they may have gotten the idea of creating a class in the Discarte case from an earlier bill filed by
another group of Channel Islanders who are '[p]erhaps the best candidates for the title 'authors of
the original class action."' Id. (citing John the Mason v. Certain Bailiffs and Ministers, 30 Seld.
Society 139 (No. 161, P.C. 1309) (1914)).
[J]ohn the mason, Piers Howel, Robert the tower, Samson Lemoeine, Andrew Les and
Thomas Amend, as some of the many tenants of a parcel of property known as Andrews
wharf... filed a challenge to ... Sir Otes' s order trebling their rents on their own behalf
and on behalf of all the other tenants.
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similar to the formation of today's complaints and the execution of
litigation.5 7
C. The First Class Actions in the United States
Though class actions developed in other parts of the world, they are
relatively new to the United States; in fact modem class actions in the United
58
States materialized at the same time as Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in 1938.

Originally, there were limits placed on the size of classes: "[u]nder the
original version of Rule 23, class members were often required to
affirmatively 'opt in' to the litigation in order to be bound to any settlement,
trial verdict, or other resolution of the case, thus placing practical limits on
the ultimate sizes of these classes." 59 Prior to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, in 1912,
Equity Rule 38 provided: "[w]hen the question is one of common or general

interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for the whole. 60
However, upon amendment in 1938, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 required
class members to affirmatively opt into the litigation as opposed to ignoring
the wishes of absent parties altogether; and unlike today, absent parties
would not be allowed a piece of any settlement reached. 6 1 Therefore,

'"

See id. (explaining difference between two historical class action cases).

58 See Pace, supra note 33, at 2 (describing adoption of Rule 23 and maturing of class actions).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1966, which included a revision to Rule 23.
John G. Harkins, Jr., FederalRule 23 The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 705, 705 (1997),
available at http://arizonalawreview.org/pdf/39-2/39arizlrev7O5.pdf. See generallyFED. R CIV. P.
23 (1938) (amended 1966).
59 Pace, supra note 33, at 2. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (amended 1966)
(explaining history leading up to amendment). The 1966 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 "greatly
expanded the scope of U.S. class actions by allowing judges to certify certain types of classes in
which participation would now be presumed for every potential member unless the individual or
entity fornally excused themselves out of the class." Pace, supra note 33, at 2; see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (explaining need for "give" of commonality to hold
together all different claims).
60 See Harkins, supra note 58, at 705 (citations omitted). See also West v. Randall 29 F. Cas.
718, 724 (D. R.I. 1820) (holding that all parties materially interested in subject matter should be
made parties to suit).
61 See J. Russell Jackson, Class Actions and the Implications of Rule 23, SCOTUSBLOG:
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES BLOG (Sept.
12, 2011, 2:26 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/class-actions-and-the-implications-of-rule-23/
(noting
"spurious" lawsuits did not bind absent members of class); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (stating
(b)(3) claims are known as damages claims).
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"spurious" lawsuits, or today more commonly known as "lawsuits involving

damages," did not bind an absent class' members to judgments.62
The 1966 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 addressed the opt-in
issue, but not without restrictions. 63 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires there
be a common question of fact to the class rather than questions pertaining to
individual members, known as the predominance requirement.6 4 Further,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 established a superiority requirement which means "the
plaintiff [bears] the burden of establishing that a class action would be
superior not just to other forms of actual litigation, but to alternative forms
65
of dispute resolution as well.1
These amendments made litigation a more practical solution for
those who otherwise would have gone without compensation for being
wronged; prior to the 1966 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 the courts saw
few class actions. 66 The amended rule opened the door to the opportunity
for a plethora of class actions resulting in an abundance of lawsuits.67 Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23 was amended again in 1998 to establish an "interlocutory
appeal provision.1 68 In 2003, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 was amended to establish
62

See Jackson, supra note 61 (indicating spurious lawsuits are now known as damages

lawsuits); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (stating effectiveness of litigating all claims together).
63 See Jackson- supra note 61 (indicating certain practices that are inappropriate under class
action lawsuits).
[A]lthough having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a
class action if there was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or
degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed. A "mass accident"
resulting in injuries to persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of
the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses
to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these
circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in
practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Id.
64

See id. (noting questions to individuals); see generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564

U.S. 338, 362-63 (2011) (expressing narrowly tailoring meaning of "common question").
65 Jackson, supra note 61 (explaining common question); see also Eric Voigt, A Company's
Voluntary Refund Programfor Consumers Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class
Action, 31 REv. LITIG. 617 (2012) (explaining history and purpose of alteration to Rule 23). "The
(b)(3) provision has had the great impact on class actions and have generated the most controversy."
John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23 What Were We Thinking? 24 Miss. C. L.
REv. 323, 325 (2005) (explaining Rule 23(b)(3) provision's history).
66 See Jackson, supra note 65 (citing Rabiej, supra note 65, at 323-24) (explaining Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 not meant to handle many class actions).
67 See Jackson- supra note 61 (noting amended rule evolved beyond original meaning).
68 See Rabiej, supra note 65, at 324. The author notes that each class action is unique, and
what allows class certification in one circumstance may not work under different circumstances.
Id. at 327.
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procedures regulating class actions. 69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is a federal
regulation, however, with the adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, many class actions that previously only had standing in state court are
now removable to federal court.70 Also, each state has adopted some version

of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23."' However, this note is only concerned with the
federal consideration of class actions.
III. FACTS
A. How Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Works
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) govern the procedure set forth for class
certification.72 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) sets forth the necessary preliminary
guidelines for class certification that must be met: numerosity, commonality,

69

See id (encouraging courts to become more involved in the class action). For example:
1) Class certification decisions are to be made at "an early practicable time" rather than
"as soon as practicable;"
2) Certification orders should define the class, and class claims, issues, or defenses;
3) Notice to class members must be in plain, easily understandable language;
4) Certification orders can be altered or amended "before final judgment" rather than
"before the decisions on the merits;"
5) Courts may no longer certify conditional classes;
6) Courts must appoint class counsel who will "fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class," and the order appointing class counsel may include provisions
relating to attorney fees and costs;
7) Parties to a settlement must identify "any agreement made in connection with the
proposed settlement;" and
8) Prior to approving a settlement agreement, the court must ensure it is "fair, reasonable,
and adequate," and may refuse to approve a settlement for a previously certified class if
it does not afford a new opportunity for class members to opt out.

Joshua B. Gray & Michelle H. Seagull, ClassAction Reaction:AmendedRule 23 EnhancesJudicial
Supervision in Class Litigation, 18 AM. BAR ASS'N 91, 91 (2004), available at

http://www.axinn.com/media/article/74_JBGMHS-ClassReaction.pdf (discussing amended Rule
23 and its effects).
70 See Pace, supra note 33, at 3 (allowing for more uniform decisions in federal courts because
state court's decisions can vary statewide); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (assuring fairer outcomes for plaintiffs and defendants).
71 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 4 (noting both class action procedure and applicable
substantive law may vary from state to state).
72 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)-(b) (delineating class certification prerequisites and types of class
actions); SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY L., FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 7.2 (Jeffrey S. Gutman et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter SHRvER CTR.],
available at http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42 (discussing Rule 23 class certification
requirements).
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typicality, and adequacy of representation. 73 Numerosity is defined as "the

class [being] so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable. 74
Commonality means "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class . . .
Typicality means "the claims or defenses of the class
representatives [that] are typical of those of the class. 7 6 Finally, adequacy
of representation means "the class representatives will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. 77 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) requires the class
to fall into one of the categories it sets forth in order to be eligible for class
certification. 78 The first category under section (b) is "that prosecution of
separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of others." 79 The second requirement

under section (b) is "that defendants acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class."8

The third requirement under section (b)

73 See SHJRiVER CTR., supra note 72 (outlining class action procedures); see generally FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) (requiring all elements of section to be met.).
71 Id. There is no rule regulating the specific number of members in a class, but the court
focuses on the "impracticality of individual joinders." Id. As a benchmark, a class of 20 or less is
likely insufficient, and classes exceeding 40 members is generally sufficient to satisfy the
requirement. Id
75 Id."[O]nly one question of law or fact must be common to the proposed class. Some factual
differences among class members do not defeat commonality." Id.
76 Id.(noting typicality focuses on plaintiffs and requires similar conduct). "The facts must
arise from a similar course of conduct and share the same legal theory..." Id. See also Gen. Tel.
Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (holding class members must possess same interest
and suffer same injury as class members).
77 See SHRIVER CTR., supra note 72 (requiring class representative to fairly and adequately
represent interests of absent class members).
78 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (defining types of class actions); see also SHRIVER CTR., supra
note 72 (noting classes must qualify under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)).
71 See SHRiVER CTR., supra note 72 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A)).

[O]ne person may have rights against, or be under duties toward, numerous persons
constituting a class and be so positioned that conflicting or varying adjudications in
lawsuits with individual members of the class might establish incompatible standards to
govern his conduct. The class action device can be used effectively to obviate the actual
or virtual dilemma which would thus confront the party opposing the class.
FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(b) (noting elements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A)).

80 SHRiVER CR., supra note 72. Under Rule 23(b)(2) a class action needs the following:

[T]he named plaintiffs must have standing for each type of relief requested. Thus, when
a named plaintiff does not have standing to seek injunctive relief, Rule 23(b)(2) class
certification is denied. Rule 23(b)(2) class members require no notice (although the
court may direct notice in unusual cases) and have no opt-out rights.
Id. The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
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is "that there [be] common questions of law or fact that predominate over
any individual class member's questions and that a class action is superior to

other methods of adjudication." 8' Only one of the three requirements set
forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) must be met, whereas all requirements listed in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) must be met.8 2 Plaintiffs bear the burden to prove that
these requirements are met.83
Additionally, courts have required
supplemental implicit requirements to be met, which include that: (1) a
definable class exists; (2) the named representatives have standing; and (3)
the claim of the class is live.8 4 Courts have further narrowed class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b), and expanded the rule by
requiring potential classes to undergo a "rigorous analysis," before
certification.85 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp. are the two most
recent cases to lay a foundation, and guide courts in determining whether a
class is certifiable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.86 Further, the Court has
considered these two cases in deliberations regarding the class certification

in Tyson Foods, Inc..8

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. See
23(b)(3). The matters pertinent to these findings include:

FED.

R. Civ. P.

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by
or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.
81 SHiZVER CTR., supra note 72.

"Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are expensive and time-

consuming, requiring notice to all class members; opportunity for opt-out; more expensive and
extensive discovery; and individual representation post-judgment. As such, counsel should
carefully consider the resources required for litigation before undertaking representation of a Rule
23(b)(3) class." Id.
82 See Alexander, supra note 3, at 4-5 (explaining distinction between requirements of FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)).
83 See id.(outlining burden of proof).
84 See SHRIVER CTR., supra note 72 (noting courts' analysis of additional requirements).
85 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (holding FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 class certification not appropriate when class seeks individualized monetary damages);
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
(arguing injury to class must predominate over individual injuries).
86 See infra Part III, Sections B and D.
87 See TysonFoods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1053 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(reviewing recent cases in holding).
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B. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 's Impact on Fed.R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(]) and (b)(2)
Wal-Mart functions as one of the largest private employers
nationwide.88 The case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. commenced when a class
of 1.5 million female employees felt they were subject to "disparate impact
and disparate treatment" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.89 However, the
employees seeking class certification here must determine a common
question of fact pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).9" Justice Scalia noted
in his opinion that the plaintiffs' claim must ride on a "common contention"
that can be resolved via a class-wide resolution. 9' In the dissent, Justice
Ginsburg argued that only a single question of law or fact must be common

to meet the commonality requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).92 The
court will undergo a "rigorous analysis" to determine if class certification
should be granted.93 Here, the class wished to sue under a Title VII claim in
general, but the class lacked a common question of fact for the court because,
generally, many events can lead to a disparate impact. 94 The general claim
of disparate impact gives no indication that all claims could be more
efficiently litigated at once. 95 The Court concerns itself with answering

88 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342 (stating Wal-Mart operates four types of stores
divided into seven nationwide divisions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2016) (noting it is
unlawful to discriminate against employees).
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 564 U.S. at 342 (introducing facts of case).
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring classes meet commonality requirement).
91 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (noting determination resolves issue central to
validity).
92 See id.
at 369-70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reviewing rule does not require all questions are
common).
9' See id at 351 (majority opinion) (holding common questions for class must have common
answers deeming them indivisible).
94 See id. at 350 (stating party seeking certification must demonstrate compliance with rule).
"Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways by intentional discrmination or by hiring
and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part
of many different superiors in a single company." Id.Title VII falls under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin,
and religion. Know Your Rights: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AAUW,
http://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/legal-resources/know-your-rights-at-work/title-vii/ (last visited
Jan. 29, 2017).
95 See Wal-MartStores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (discussing commonality of case). Accordingto
Justice Scalia and the majority:
[T]heir claims must depend upon a common contention for example, the assertion of
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution which

206

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

common problems rather than simply a common question of fact. 96 "[T]he
plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged." 97 Ultimately, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. resulted in narrowly
tailored classes spinning off of the original lawsuit in regional courts. 98
Additionally, Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. interpreted whether Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(b)(2) can be used to recover individualized monetary relief for a
class. 99 "Rule 23(b)(2) allows class treatment when 'the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole."""0 Indivisibility is key to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because damages are either common to the whole class
or to no one.' 0 ' Class certification is not authorized when each individual
member would be entitled to different awards. 1°2
The Court interpreted Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in light of the facts of
this case. 0 3 Justice Scalia looked toward the Advisory Committee's opinion
stating that "Rule 23(b)(2) 'does not extend to cases in which the appropriate

means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
Id.
96

See id. At 349, (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age ofAggregate

Proof 84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 97, 131-32 (2009)) (noting language canbe misread since complaint can
easily look like common question).
97 Id. at 395 (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994, (1988); accord
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (upholding Watson statement),
supersededby statute on othergrounds; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(k)). Also, in Wal-MartStores,Inc.,

"[o]ther than the bare existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no 'specific
employment practice' much less one that ties all 1.5 million claims together." Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 564 U.S. at 357 (noting issues with general discretion in common questions). "Merely
showing that Wal-Mart' s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not
suffice." See id. (explaining disparity must be great).
9' See Scott Flaherty, 3 Years After Dukes, Employees Struggle In Wal-Mart Cases, LAW 360,

July 17, 2014, http://www.law360.com/articles/558047/3-years-after-dukes-employees-strugglein-wal-mart-cases. Plaintiff sought to narrow her class from 1.5 million to 150,000 but the court
denied the claim, again for lack of commonality. Id.
99 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 360 (analyzing Plaintiffs' claims for back pay under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).
100 See id. (holding individual class members may not recover individual monetary relief).
101 See id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certificationin the Age of Aggregate Proof
84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (highlighting remedy warranted must be applicable to all class

members).

See id. at 360-61.
103 See id. at 363-64 (requiring judicial findings of superiority and predominance to certify
102

class).
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final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages. '"104
Justice Scalia ultimately disagreed with the Advisory Committee's
interpretation, believing that members of the class failed to include
employees' compensatory damages, and included only backpay claims;
therefore, making it more likely that monetary relief would not
"predominate.'

0 °5

As a result, the Court held this class was not certifiable. 0

6

C. Recent Interpretationof Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Since the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. decision, it has been positively cited
in several cases, such as Shirkov v. Dunlap,10 7 where plaintiff sought to
certify a class of defendants for copyright infringement. 0 8 Justice O'Toole
cited Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 109
Justice O'Toole explained that it is not enough to demonstrate that the

defendant's targeted each member of the class, each member was injured in
the same way, nor is it enough that each class member experienced the same
violation of the law. 10 Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate commonality
because some plaintiffs may have made the suggested settlement payment,
incurred legal expenses, or failed to respond to the demand letter."' All Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a) requirements must be met before analyzing the issues at hand
regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 12

104

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 363. (citations omitted) (noting appropriate

monetary damages).
105 See id.at 366 (holding Wal Mart was entitled to individualized determinations of each
employee's eligibility for backpay). Justice Scalia continued to speculate that some back pay
claims may not have been based on discrimination; therefore, that employee would be estopped
from taking part in the class action. Id. Justice Ginsburg's dissent noted that the court should "train
its attention' on what unites a class rather than what divides the class. Id. at 377 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
106 See id at 367 (majority opinion) (holding certification fails if litigated on individual
claims).
107 Shirokov, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42787, at *46.
108Id.
109 See id (holding all 23(a) requirements were not satisfied and motion to certify class was
denied). The plaintiff sought to certify a group of defendants who he believed designed a scheme
to profit from copyright infringement. Id.at *1-2. Justice O'Toole stated class members must show
commonality to reveal that such members have suffered the same injuries. Id. at *46 (using Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 (b) interpretation propagated by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.).
110 See id at *5-6 (noting violations of law are not enough if common).
...See id at *69 (noting legal expenses not directly attributable).
112 See SHRivER CTR., supra note 72 (noting class never went through Rule 23(b) analysis
because did not meet Rule 23(a) requirements).
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Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), in HalliburtonCo. v.EricaP. John Fund,
Inc.,"3 a securities fraud claim where plaintiffs of the class could have been
required to prove direct reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation,
plaintiffs would have been precluded from the class because individual
issues would predominate over the class's common issues." 4 In Basic v.
Levinson's," 5 Justice Roberts examines the case's consideration for
rebuttable presumption of reliance on the misrepresentation instead of direct
reliance, which would have made class certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) inappropriate." 6
Rebuttable presumption of reliance was
appropriate because "the Court based that presumption on what is known as
the 'fraud-on-the-market' theory, which holds that 'the market price of
shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available

information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations. 111 7 However,
Justice Roberts determined that publicity and market efficiency must be
proved before he could implement Basic's theory."'
D. Comcast Corp. 's Impact on Rule 23(b) (3)
Comcast Corp. added another tool to employers' toolboxes for
fighting class certification by interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)." 9 Two
million past and present Comcast subscribers sought damages from Comcast
for violating federal antitrust laws.20 Comcast subscribers sought to certify

113 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407-08 (2014).
114

See id at 2407-08 (affirming Basic's economic theory of reliance in securities fraud

actions).
115 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988).
116 See id. at 242 (noting individualized reliance would prevent class actions).
117 Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2408 (quotingBasic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246). Here, the theory
of reliance was based on: (1) [t]he alleged misrepresentation[ was] publicly known, (2) [the
misrepresentations] were material, (3) [t]he stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) [t]he
plaintiff traded the stock between the time the misrepresentation[ was] made and when the truth
was revealed. See id.(citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248).
118 See id. at 2415-16 (explaining prerequisites still rest with plaintiffs).
119 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1436, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (holding class was improperly certified because common issue of damages did not
predominate). Here, common damages attributed to the accepted theory would not be common
across the class. Id. at 1435 (majority opinion). "In light of the model's inability to bridge the
differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra-competitive prices attributable
to the deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers within the
Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class." Id.
120 See id.at 1430. Comcast Corporation is a media and technology company, which consists
of two companies: Comcast Cable and NBC Universal. COMCAST: COMPANY OVERVIEW,
http://corporate.comcast.com/news-infonnation/company-overview (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
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a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), which only permitted class
certification if "the court could find that the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.' 121 To meet the predominance requirement it is necessary to (1)
show that injury is common to the class and not to individual members of
the class; and (2) establish that damages are measurable on a class-wide
basis. 22 They established four theories of certification, but the district court
only admitted one: "Comcast's activities reduced the level of competition
from 'over-builders,' companies that build competing cable networks in
areas where an incumbent cable company already operates," and it also
determined that damages could be calculated on a class-wide basis. 23 Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) contributes to the "rigorous analysis" class-actions must
undergo before class certification is granted because it gives courts an

[F]rom 1998 to 2007, petitioners engaged ina series of transactions that the parties have
described as "clustering," a strategy of concentrating operations within a particular
region. The region at issue here, which the parties have referred to as the Philadelphia
"cluster" or the Philadelphia "Designated Market Area" (DMA), includes 16 counties
located in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. Petitioners pursued their clustering
strategy by acquiring competitor cable providers in the region and swapping their own
systems outside the region for competitor systems located in the region. For instance, in
2001, petitioners obtained Adelphia Communications' cable systems in the Philadelphia
DMA, along with its 464,000 subscribers; in exchange, petitioners sold to Adelphia their
systems in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California. As a result of nine
clustering transactions, petitioners' share of subscribers in the region allegedly increased
from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007. The named plaintiffs, respondents
here, are subscribers to Comcast's cable-television services. They filed a class-action
antitrust suit against petitioners, claiming that petitioners entered into unlawful swap
agreements, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and monopolized or attempted to
monopolize services in the cluster, in violation of §2. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended,

15 U.S.C. §§1, 2.
Id.
121

See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432-35 (holding class action was improperly certified

under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
122 See id. (stating necessary requirements demanded of respondents).
123 Id. at 1430-31. There were four theories that respondents presented to the district court
claiming they caused Comcast to increase cable subscription rates. Id.
[F]irst, Comcast's clustering made it profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports
programming from its competitors, resulting in decreased market penetration by direct
broadcast satellite providers. Second, Comcast's activities reduced the level of
competition from "over-builders," companies that build competing cable networks in
areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. Third, Comcast reduced the
level of "benchmark" competition on which cable customers rely to compare prices.
Fourth, clustering increased Comcast's bargaining power relative to content providers.
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opportunity to determine whether individual questions predominate over
class ones and vice versa. 124 Ultimately, on appeal, respondents' action was
improperly certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because "[b]y refusing to
entertain arguments against respondents' damages model that bore on the
propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also
be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of
our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry."'1 25 Further, it is clear that
under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents' model

falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a
class-wide basis.126 Without presenting another methodology, respondents
could not establish Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) "predominance." 27 Comcast
therefore, concluded that lower courts must implement a rigorous analysis to
determine whether the issue of predominance set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) is satisfied and that individual issues of damages may preclude class
certification. 28 Here, Justice Scalia concluded in his opinion that the method
of measuring class-wide damages did not clearly show that damages were
measurable on a class-wide basis. 129 In their dissent, Justice Ginsberg and
Justice Breyer note that a class is certifiable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) when questions common to the class predominates over individual
class member damages. 30 They argue that the class was not given a fair

124
125
126
127

See id. at 1432.
Id. at 1432-33.
See id.
See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1434 (analyzing class members' methodology for

certification). Justice Scalia affirmed that:
[B]ecause the only surviving theory of antitrust impact is that clustering reduced
overbuilding, for Dr. McClave's comparison to be relevant, his benchmark counties must
reflect the conditions that would have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA but for the
alleged reduction in overbuilding. In all respects unrelated to reduced overbuilding, the
benchmark counties should reflect the actual conditions in the Philadelphia DMA, or
else the model will identify 'damages' that are not the result of reduced overbuilding, or,
in "words, that are not the certain result of the wrong.
Id. (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 216 (3rd Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
128 See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., The 2015 Workplace Class Action Litigation Report,
SEYEARTH SHAW (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2015/01/its-here-the2015-workplace-class-action-litigation-report/ (giving brief review of court's finding in Comcast
Corp.).
129 See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433 ("[T]he model failed to measure damages resulting
from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners' liability in this action is premised.").
130 See id. at 1437 (Ginsberg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (finding even when damages are not
available, claim is allowed).
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opportunity to discuss the predominance of its issue because the issue of
predominance was only brought up subsequent to briefing. 3 '
E. Tyson Foods, Inc. FacesIssues with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
One of the most recent class actions to seek class certification is
Tyson Foods, Inc. 31 2 Tyson Foods, Inc. operates a slaughterhouse in Iowa,
and its employees brought suit when Tyson failed to compensate them for
overtime hours as well as liquidated damages for failing to compensate the
employees for time spent walking to and from workstations, as well as
putting on and removing personal protective equipment.'3 3 Here, the court
was faced with two questions in the challenge to the original class

certification by Tyson: (1) whether a class may be certified when it includes
uninjured class members; and (2) whether damages of the whole class can
be averaged to represent the damages of each individual class member. 3 4 In
response to the second question, the Court in Tyson evaluated whether
differing individual class member's relief can be ignored pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(3).' 35 In Tyson Foods, Inc., some members of the class had
compensable injuries while others did not. 3 6 Plaintiffs sought to average the
damages of the members of the class because some employees worked
overtime while others did not, and some employees spent more time than

131 See id. at 1436 (discussing unfair opportunity given to class by disallowing opportunity to

prove predominance).
132 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016); see also Paul Karlgodt, 5 Big Development in PrivacyClassActions
in 2015, and 3 to Look for in 2016, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Dec. 31 2015),
http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/data-breaches/significant-developments-in-privacy-classactions-in-2015-and-what-to-watch-for-in-2016/ (contemplating whether statistical methods can
assist in certifying class actions); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 791 (8th Cir.
2014), cert.granted,135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015), aff'd and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (deciding
group of Tyson employees are certifiable class).
133 See Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Big Test of Class Action
Maybe Not So Big,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 10, 2015, 1:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/argumentanalysis-big-test-of-class-action-maybe-not-so-big (noting plaintiffs worked in slaughterhouses).
Justice Beam's dissenting opinion notes that by averaging employees' compensable claims, the
worker is the equivalent of a "fictional average employee." Id. (citations omitted).
134 See id. at 1049-50 (explaining issues facing court).
135 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/tyson-foods-inc-v-bouaphakeo/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); see also . Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (holding individual class members cannot seek individual
relief pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(3)).
136 See id. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1049 (noting some employees
worked overtime, some did not, and some activities took longer than others).
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others "donning" and "doffing" over protective equipment. 31 7 Further, each
employee at the Tyson factory had different jobs requiring different
equipment, while others having the same job had personal preferences to
38
wear certain protective gear. 1

Tyson argued, by citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Comcast Corp.,
that individual relief per member cannot be sought because there was no
predominance over the class issue. 139 Pursuant to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Tyson attempted to prove that the class should not be certified because
damages could not be awarded "in one stroke." 40 On appeal, Justice Beam
stated that the class of Tyson employees should not have been certified

because many of the class members were either not injured, or suffered very
minor injuries. 1 41 Justice Benton disagreed, holding that it is permitted to

use a "reasonable inference to determine liability and damages. '"42
Ultimately, in a March 2016 decision, the court decided to certify the Tyson
class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because time spent "donning and
doffing" over protective equipment predominated over the common
43

question. 1

F. Recent Trends in Class Action Litigation?
These narrowly tailored definitions of class certification pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(2), and (b)(3) provide companies faced with
14 4
class action lawsuits significant power in defeating class certification.

137

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8 , Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036

(2016) (No. 14-1146) [hereinafter Petitionfor Writ of Certiorari](arguing class should be able to
use statistical methods to determine predominance of issue).
138 See id. at 4-6 (describing employees' personal protective equipment). The class sought
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) certification, but the district court believed "'there [we]re some very big
factual differences among hourly employees at Tyson."' Id. at 7. However, the district court
certified the class because the timing system tied the Tyson employees together under a single
common question. Id.
139 See sources cited supra note 120 and 127 (holding of Comcast Corp. stating necessity of
proving predominance).
140 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,supra note 137, at 8; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
564 U.S. at 338.
141 See id. at 13-4 (explaining rationale of judicial finding).
142 See id. at 14 (hiring expert to calculate averages of employee "donning" and "doffing" by
creating random employee sample).
143 See generally, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1039 (2016) (certifying
class caused Tyson to pay employees $2.9 million in damages).
144 See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., It's Here-The 2015 Workplace Class Action LitigationReport,
SEYFARTH SHAW: WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION BLOG (Jan. 6, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Workplace
Class Action], http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2015/0 1/its-here-the-2015-workplace-class-
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Nevertheless, businesses have seen a fluctuating and unpredictable trend in
the Supreme Court's decision-making since the decisions in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., Comcast Corp. and now Tyson.'4 5 In 2015, lawyers saw an
increase in monetary relief granted to plaintiffs through class action
lawsuits.1 46 Further, seventy-five percent of classes were certified in 2015
despite the stringent and narrowly tailored definition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
produced by Wal-MartStores, Inc. and Comcast Corp.147 Some courts have
allowed plaintiffs to use Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) to bring damages claims on
behalf of uninjured individuals.148 Such individuals should
not have a claim
49
for damages, but these courts have allowed this practice. 1
IV. ANALYSIS
A. What Does This Mean for the Future of Employers?
Employers are faced with an ever-changing playing field for success
in class action lawsuits. 15° Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. has remained the precedent
for determining class certification, but each court interprets the case
differently. 151 This variety of interpretation creates difficulty in formulating
a defense against class certification. 152 However, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and
Comcast Corp. provide leverage for employers to defeat class certification
because it becomes extremely difficult for employees to meet the burdens
action-litigation-report (describing pro-worker and pro-employer voices of Supreme Court
Justices).
145 See id. (explaining impact of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp.).
146 See id. (noting 2014 settlements were $1.87 billion and 2015 settlements were $2.48
billion).
147 See id. (exceeding number of certified classes in employment discrimination, wage and
hours, and ERISA class actions). Class actions settled by the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act had the highest grossing monetary relief for plaintiffs at $926.5 million. Large
Workplace ClassAction Settlements in 2015 Rake in All-Time High Report, REUTERS (Jan. 13,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-employment-classaction-idUSL2N14XON320160113;
see generally EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 AMENDMENT, 1993
Bill Tracking H.R. 1036 (showing list provides for protection of employment benefits rights and
lists amendment history).
148 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 137, at 8 (noting instance where damages
allowed).
149 See id.
150 See cases cited supra notes 107-109, 114, 129. While the Supreme Court is often seen to
be a pro-business institution, the rulings of 2015 seem to speak otherwise. Id. In fact, an array of
class actions are lined up for the Supreme Court in 2016, and it is undetermined how the Supreme
Court will rule in these cases. Id.
151 See supra notes 107-109, 114, 119 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 107-109, 114, 119 and accompanying text.
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created by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.13 This leverage should deter courts from
granting class certification. 5 4 The requirements are strict and narrowly
tailored, and meant to create difficulty in forming a class.155 Unfortunately,
much of class certification success is based upon whether the court is pro56

business or pro-worker. 1

B. What Does This Mean for the Future of Employees?
On the other hand, legislation such as the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), creates both an outlet and an opportunity
for disgruntled class members to stand behind and seek relief for any alleged
injustice. 15 Government organizations want to lead by example and punish
employers who they feel treat employees unfairly. 158 Further, with Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp. createding a strict interpretation of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23, there is also the possibility that smaller classes will break off of a
failed larger class. 159 In turn, this would create many small class action
lawsuits. 160 If a court dismissed Fed. R. Civ. P. 23's strict definition under
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp., and allowed for each member of
the class to prove his or her individual damages, trials would be prolonged
and fees would increase significantly. 16 1 However, giving employers power
through Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 becomes a risk to employers and employees alike;

153 See supra Part II Section A (establishing class certification requirements).
154 See id.
155 See id.; Alexander, supra note 3, at 1-5 (regarding common issues, predominance

requirement difficulty, and common monetary relief).
156 See Maatman, supra note 144 (noting class actions certification decisions will depend on
decision maker).
157 See EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 AMENDMENT, 1993 Bill
Tracking H.R. 1036 (providing protection of employment benefits rights). The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") is a federal law that sets minimum standards
for most voluntarily established pension and health plans in private industry to provide protection
for individuals in these plans. Health Plans & Benefits: ERJSA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
158 See Maatman, supra note 144 (noting ERISA and Department of Labor brought
substantially more lawsuits in 2015 than 2014).
159 See Flaherty, supra note 98 (discussing regional class actions originating from action in
2014 against Wal-Mart). The court has already seen this trend. Id.After Wal-Mart, Stores, Inc., a
class of 150,000 broke off of the original 1.5 million person class to form a new lawsuit. Id. The
Court, however, would not accept the appeal to certify the class on grounds that this was only a
"scaled down version" of the earlier case. Id.
160 See id.
161 See Barry Barnett, The Next Death to Class Actions, THE CONTINGENCY (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.thecontingency.com/2015/11 /the-next-death-threat-to-class-actions/
wide proof is the practical means of recovering for members).

(noting

class-
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but now, with the Tyson decision, employees and consumers have a greater
opportunity to have their cause of action heard because the predominance
requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is now more easily met

162

C. What Tyson Foods, Inc. Meansfor Future Classes Seeking Certification
As noted, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp. sought to
narrowly tailor the definition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 pertaining to class actions
as to make stricter qualifications when certifying a class for a class action
lawsuit. 163 In light of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court must undergo a
"rigorous analysis" in order to certify the class in this case. 64 Therefore, the
court would have to determine that the class has a common question of fact
according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 1 65 If all Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
requirements are met, then the court moves to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
conditions. For example, under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the class must also
meet the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) requirement of indivisibility requiring that
relief be appropriate to the class as a whole. 166 The main question in Tyson
Foods, Inc. is whether the class meets the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement. 67 In order to predominate, no individual
question can predominate over class questions. 68 The following section will
discuss why Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requirements are met, and how Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) requirements fail pursuant to recent case law. 169
D. Tyson and Rule 23 Requirements
Here, the employees attempted to form a class in pursuit of a claim
against Tyson, alleging that Tyson failed to pay them overtime payment and
also failed to pay them for the time required taking on and off personal
protective equipment. 70 First, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and in
light of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court must look at the class's common
question of fact, which is that Tyson failed to compensate employees for
overtime wages and time dressing and undressing in safety equipment
162 See id. (promoting use of class actions for fair business practices).

163 See case cited supra note 13 and accompanying text.
164 See case cited supra note 13 and accompanying text.
165
166
167
168
169
170

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part II, Section C and Part III, Section A.
supra Part III, Secton A.
supra Part III, Section A and accompanying text.
sources cited supra note 12 (requiring predominance in class actions).
infra Part IV, SectionD.
Denniston, supra note 133 (evaluating relief sought by Tyson employees.).
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required for the job. 7 ' Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) this is a common
question of fact because all members of the class claim the same injury with
slight discrepancies. 7 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) actually states that some
slight factual difference do not defeat commonality.'7 3
Secondly, in regard to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2), the court must determine if the relief sought by the class
members is appropriate to the whole class.'74 Here, the class sought to
average the damages because some members of the class had compensable
injuries while others did not.'75 This is because the number of overtime hours
per employee, who wishes to join the class, differs, and because the time
spent putting on protective equipment and taking off protective equipment
differs per employee. 17 6 Further, the plaintiffs' wish to ignore the
requirement of indivisibility created by this time discrepancy.'
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., clearly states that under a rigorous analysis,
the difference in time created by each employee would not allow the class in
Tyson to be eligible to be certified as a class because each individual would
require a different amount of relief.'7 8 However, it would be impossible to
get a class certified under these circumstances because each individual
moves at a different pace and may be required to work different over time
hours; and further, the difference in time spent for each employee to dress
and undress would be minimal. 179 Due to this difference, which can be
attributed to human nature, the facts cannot be strictly and literally analyzed
under the narrowly tailored requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) created
by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 8 ' Instead, it must be determined that these facts
are similar enough to meet the requirement of indivisibility; in fact, each
individual claims the same injury - that he or she was not compensated for
his or her time spent at the Tyson factory, meaning the court should
recognize the indivisibility of the Tyson class, under Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2),
and allow for the averaging of damages to determine the relief sought. 8'
supra Part III, Section A.
See supra Part III, Section A and accompanying text.
173 See supra Part III, Section A and accompanying text.
174 See supra Part III, Section A and accompanying text.
175 See sources cited supra notes 13, 15 and 140 (discussing basis for class members'
certification).
176 See sources cited supra notes 13, 15 and 140.
177 See sources cited supra notes 13, 15 and 143; see also Denniston, supra note 133
(explaining issues with class action).
178 See supra note 13.
179 See Part III, Section A.
171 See

172

180 See Part III, Section A

181 See case cited supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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However, this leads to an issue seeking certification pursuant to the
Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance because if each
individual class member's relief is different, individual issues will then
predominate over the class issue according to the rulings of Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. and Comcast Corp.18 2 In light of Comcast Corp., the class members
must meet the predominance requirement under Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(3). 183
The predominance requirement requires that no individual issues in the class
dominates the rest of the class. 8 4 Here, there is a difference between each
individual's injuries. 85 This would indicate that there might be a class
member that predominates over the others, which would be in violation of
Rule 23(b)(3). 86 Nonetheless, should the court allow for the averaging of
relief, then each individual member would have to accept that he or she was
injured to the same extent that the other members were injured. 87 If the
class members do not accept the average loss of the class members then
individual relief predominates over class relief.88 In Wal-MartStores, Inc.,
according to Justice Scalia, the class would be non-certifiable. 89 Here, each
member seeks relief for the same injury but through a statistical mechanism
of averaging all the losses. 190 In addition, averaging monetary relief is not
equivalent to individuals seeking class relief. 191
Therefore, class
predominance does not exist, and this class should not be certifiable pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(3). 92 Thus, the Tyson Foods, Inc. decision opens the
flood gates for copious amounts of classes to meet the predominance
requirement, where the lack of predominance once would have destroyed the
class. 193 Here, Tyson employees find themselves in a similar situation as the
employees in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 194 Different amounts of overtime were
worked and different amounts of time were spent putting on and taking off

182 See supra note 85.
183 See supra notes 8, 12, and 45.
184 See supra note 45.
185 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (discussing individual injuries

and predominance requirement).
186 See supra Part III, Section A.
187 See supra notes 45 and 132 and accompanying text.
188 See rule cited supra note 45.
189 See supra note 85.
190 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
191 See Denniston, supra note 133.
192 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (defining class predominance); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 338(2011) (explaining class predominance); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,., 133
S. Ct. 1426, 1426 (2013) (same).
193 See supra Part III, Section A.
194 See Denniston, supra note 133.
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protective equipment. 195 This mirrors the situation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Comcast Corp., and Halliburton, where monetary claims varied among
plaintiffs. 196 In each case the court held that the claim was non-certifiable
because individual claims predominated over the class claim. 197 Tyson
Foods, Inc. created a significant change in the direction class actions were
headed.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of class certification will continue to plague courts.
Interpreting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. will become less significant while Tyson
Foods, Inc. will become the standard defense for many classes seeking
certification. It is likely to continue the rigorous analysis under Wal-Mart
Store, Inc., but moving in the liberal direction of Tyson Foods, Inc., which
fails to deter classes from seeking class certification.
As was stated in the introduction, there is power in numbers and
unity. Or is there? The court has the discretion to single handedly tear down
a class of plaintiffs or defendants hoping to try a case. The Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) threshold is an incredibly subjective threshold to meet. Class
actions evolved to provide a platform to aggregate claims that would not
otherwise be heard individually. But a class action claim will not be heard
unless a class action is the appropriate forum for the claim to be held, and
damages must be uniform to the entire class. This strict definition has been
developed through case law such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Comcast Corp.,
and most recently Tyson Foods, Inc. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast
Corp. require each class to undergo a rigorous analysis to assure these
requirements have been obtained. An average of each class members'
damages is not enough under the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Comcast Corp.
tests. Is this fair? How can each member be injured in the exact same way?
Tyson Foods, Inc. answered this question in 2016 loosening up the strict
requirement to achieve class certification. But will the courts continue to
move in this liberal direction? While there were once many obstacles to
overcome before a class could become certified and have the claim heard in
court, now there is one less stringent requirement - predominance. With the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requirement, the power lies within the companies
being sued, and it should be shifted back to the plaintiffs who were wronged,
as it was in Tyson Foods, Inc. Just because the wrongs may have been minor
195

See Denniston, supra note 133 and accompanying text.

196

See supra notes 85, 115 and 120 and accompanying text.

197 See supra notes 84, 115, and 119.
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does not mean that a company should not make it right. Class action lawsuits
should continue to hold the same function as they once did. Plaintiffs should
be made whole without the extra rigorous analysis. It is not up to future class
actions to determine whether the courts will continue to move in this
direction or if they will hold classes to the strict rigorous analysis under
Comcast Corp. and Wal-Mart, Stores, Inc.
Chelsey E. Turner

